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merely performing its duty of pronouncing upon the validity of a given
statute. Admittedly, the end result of this course of action may be the
districting of Indiana in accordance with the provisions of the 1885 dis-
tricting act. It is submitted, however, that neither the conscientious legis-
lators nor the alert voters of Indiana will permit such a possibility to
become a reality.
CRIMINAL CONTEMPT: VIOLATIONS OF INJUNCTIONS IN
THE FEDERAL COURTS
The courts' power of contempt has been one of the most hated and
feared remedies known to our legal system. This is chiefly due to the
awful potential which is inherent in a system that allows the judge, one
instinctively pictured as an impartial arbiter of justice, to become a prose-
cutor in greater or lesser degrees depending on the nature of the con-
tempt.' Other factors contributing to the potential power of the court
are the possibility of penal sanction and the relaxation of the usual pro-
I. Where contempt is committed in the presence of the court, the offender may be
summarily tried and punished by the judge acting on his own motion. FED. R. CRIm. P.
42(a). This is often referred to as direct contempt.
In criminal contempt committed outside the actual presence of the court, such as
disobedience of injunctions, the judge may decide if contempt proceedings are to be
initiated. This function is analogous to the discretion of a prosecutor in initiating
criminal prosecution. FED. R. CRI.M. P. 42(b). Criminal contempt committed outside
the actual presence of the court need not be prosecuted by a United States attorney.
The court may appoint any competent attorney to serve as "prosecutor." FED. R. CRIr.
P. 42(b) ; Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517 (1925) ; United States v. Lederer, 140
F.2d 136 (7th Cir. 1944) ; In re Eskay, 122 F.2d 819 (3rd Cir. 1941). This is justified
by the reasoning that the incentive to discover this type of injury outweighs the in-
terests of "theoretical" impartiality. But the duty of the prosecutor is to protect the
innocent as well as the guilty and this duty may well be slighted where the prosecutor is
the attorney who represented the defendant's opponent in the civil suit for injunction.
Therefore, the desired impartiality, in this situation, seems to be something more than
"theoretical." On the other hand the prosecutor is chosen, either directly or indirectly,
by the people and the offense involved is one committed against the authority of the
courts which are instruments of the government. Therefore, the courts' inherent power
should not extend to the point of displacing one chosen by society to prosecute wrongs
committed against it. Judge Learned Hand supports this position in it re Guzzardi, 74
F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1935). However, he later reversed himself and followed the accepted
rule that a U. S. attorney is not required to act as prosecutor in criminal contempt cases.
McCann v. New York Stock Exchange, 80 F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1935).
Where the court chooses a private attorney as prosecutor, the judge must imme-
diately enter an order directing the attorney to criminally prosecute the contempt and
include a copy of this order in the process papers. Thus the crucial factor is one of
notice. The defendant must be notified of the criminal nature of the charges against
him. United States v. Lederer, supra; McCann v. New York Stock Exchange, supra;
United States v. Balaban, 267 F. Supp. 491 (N.D. Ill. 1939).
See Note, 25 TULANE L. Rav. 266 (1951) ; Comment, 57 YALE L.J. 83 (1947).
NOTES
cedural protection accorded to one in jeopardy of imprisonment.2 While
it is true that the contempt power might become a vehicle for the imposi-
tion of judicial tyranny if used improperly, statutes' and judicial self-
restraint have tempered its exercise. It is a useful and important remedy,
the abrogation of which would seriously handicap the judicial system.
In respect to its role in enforcement of injunctions, the necessity for
the contempt power is obvious.4 It is the sole means available to the
courts by which they may see that their decrees are carried out and with-
out this power the remedy of injunction would be illusory. Both the
2. A defendant in criminal contempt proceedings is not entitled to a jury trial. In
re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895) ; Eilenbecker v. District Court, 134 U.S. 31 (1890). See
Comment, 65 YALE LJ. 846 (1956). However, the right to jury trial can be conferred
by statute. Maynard v. United States, 23 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1927). Also, an indict-
ment is not necessary, even though the punishment may be longer than one year. United
States v. Balaban, 26 F. Supp. 491 (N.D. Ill. 1939); Anargyros v. Anargyros & Co.,
191 Fed. 208 (N.D. Calif. 1911).
However, the burden of proof is on the government and the contempt must be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Michaelson v. United States, ex rel. Chicago, St. P.,
M., & 0. Ry., 266 U.S. 42 (1924) ; United States ex rel. Porter v. Kroger Grocery &
Baking Co., 163 F.2d 168 (7th Cir. 1947). Double jeopardy may also apply to criminal
contempt. See In re Bradley, 318 U.S. 50 (1943). The criminal rules of appeal govern
the appellate procedure for criminal contempt. McCrone v. United States, 100 F.2d
322 (9th Cir. 1938). Also, the President's pardoning power under the federal constitu-
tion extends to criminal contempt, Ex parte Grossman, 167 U.S. 87 (1925), as does the
privilege against self-incrimination. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, (1886);
Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 444 (1911) (dictum) ; Merchants'
Stock & Grain Co. v. Bd. of Trade, 201 Fed. 20, 22 (8th Cir. 1912) (dictum). The
three year statute of limitations on crimes applies to criminal contempt. Pendergast v.
United States, 317 U.S. 608 (1943) ; Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604 (1914).
3. 62 STAY. 701 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1952). "A court of the United States
shall have the power to punish by fine or imprisonment, at its discretion, such contempt
of its authority, and none other, as-
(1) Misbehavior of any person in its presence or so near thereto as to obstruct the
administration of justice;
(2) Misbehavior of one of its officers in their official transactions;
(3) Disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree or
command." In Morgan v. United States, 95 F.2d 830 (8th Cir. 1938), the court noted
that the above statute has limited the common law concept of criminal contempt. The
defendant obtained money from a trustee in bankruptcy by false representations. The
court said this would be criminal contempt at common law but does not come within
the terms of the statute.
FED. R. CRim. P. 42(b). "A criminal contempt except as provided in subdivision
(a) of this rule [contempts committed in actual presence of the court], shall be prose-
cuted on notice. The notice shall state the time and place of hearing, allowing a rea-
sonable time for the preparation of the defense, and shall state the essential facts con-
stituting the criminal contempt charged and describe it as such. The notice shall be
given orally by the judge in open court in the presence of the defendant, or, on appli-
cation of the United States attorney or of an attorney appointed by the court for that
purpose, by an order to show cause or an order of arrest. . . ." In United States v.
United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1946), this rule was interpreted as requiirng only
that the defendant be aware of the nature of the charge, regardless of the fact that the
rule seems to require that th words "criminal contempt" actually be used. See 17
Federal Rides Decisions 167 (1955).
4. Moskovitz, Contempt of Injunctions, Cizil and Criminal, 43 COLUAI. L. REv. 780
(1943).
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fear and importance of the contempt power become more apparent in the
use of criminal contempt in enforcing injunctions. This has been espe-
cially true during period of great social strife such as the labor movement
and prohibition.' Therefore, in absence of civil rights legislation pre-
empting the field, the criminal contempt power of the federal courts is
certain to play an important role in enforcing desegregation orders.'
Since courts have not set out a standard defining the evidentiary limits
of criminal contempt in respect to disobedience of a court decree, it is
important to determine the components of criminal contempt from the
standpoint of what acts constitute, and who may be guilty of the offense.
Contempt is a disregard or disobedience of public authority. As
applied to injunctions, criminal contempt is wilful disobedience of the
courts' decree, thus resulting in a disregard for the courts' authority.
Criminal contempt in the federal courts has to some extent been limited.
both substantively and procedurally, by statute; but for the most part,
the common law rules still prevail.' Formulation of general rules deter-
mining the evidentiary requirements for criminal contempt is difficult
because the violation is defined largely by the terms of the specific in-
junction. For example, a guard accused of mishandling a federal prisoner
in a county jail could not be convicted of criminal contempt because this
conduct was not embodied in a decree.8 But where there was a court
order committing a prisoner into the custody of a sheriff to be held safe
until the expiration of his sentence, his conduct in allowing a prisoner to
go free was criminal contempt.' Thus it is seen that an injunction is
analogous to a criminal statute. Conduct not forbidden cannot be crimi-
nal contempt. But, like statutes, injunctions frequently must be phrased
in general terms to be effective and therefore require subsequent judicial
interpretation to ascertain what they prohibit."0 As a result, a wide range
5. See Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604 (1914) ; Ex parte Lennon, 166 U.S.
548 (1897) ; In re Debs 158 U.S. 564 (1895) ; Hill v. United States, 33 F.2d 489 (8th
Cir. 1929) ; McFarland v. United States, 295 Fed. 648 (7th Cir. 1923) ; In re Reese, 107
Fed. 942 (8th Cir. 1901).
6. Brown v. Bd. of Education, 394 U.S. 294 (1955) ; Frazier v. Bd. of Trustees, 134
F. Supp. 589 (M.D. N.C. 1955). See Comment, Legal Sanction to Enforce Desegrega-
tion It the Public Schools: The Contempt Power and the Civil Rights Act, 65 YALE
LJ. 630.
7. See note 3 supra. A conspiracy to commit contempt is not criminal contempt.
Kelton v. United States, 294 Fed. 491 (3d Cir. 1924) ; Doniphan v. Lehman, 179 Fed. 173
(C.C. Ind. 1902).
8. Wilson v. United States, 26 F.2d 215 (8th Cir. 1928).
9. Swepston v. United States, 251 Fed. 205 (6th Cir. 1918) ; United States v. Hoff-
man, 13 F.2d 269 (N.D. II. 1925).
10. The court has the power to enjoin acts which are of the same class as those
complained of or whose commission in the future may be fairly anticipated from the
defendant's past conduct. NLRB v. Express Publishing Co., 312 U.S. 426 (1941);
Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Stablemen & Helpers v. United States,
NOTES
of conduct is prohibited and a judge trying a criminal contempt case is
often faced with border-line situations which he must classify as violative
or non-violative. The courts have been rather strict in requiring a clear
violation. Perhaps this is a result of the heavy burden of proof, beyond
a reasonable doubt, or it may be a judicial reaction against the harshness
of imposing penal sanctions without the usual procedural protection of
jury trial. Thus it was not criminal contempt to write letters criticizing
the government and the litigation leading to the decree to those whose
duty it was to obey the injunction if the letters "were not directly calcu-
lated to invite disobedience."'" Where the decree prohibited the manu-
facture or sale of intoxicating beverages, making of near beer was not
a violation.'" At one stage of the brewing process, the alcoholic content
exceeded the minimum requirements of one half of one percent, but the
excess was extracted at a later stage.
It is apparent that courts have been careful to require acts amount-
ing to a clear violation of the injunction before instituting criminal con-
tempt proceedings. But what is a clear violation seems to depend more
on the natural and probable results of the defendant's conduct rather than
on the conduct itself. The court will examine the acts in light of sur-
rounding circumstances and if the direct consequences of the act tend to
result in a violation, then the conduct constitutes a criminal contempt.
For example, inciting or urging others to violate the injunction is crimi-
nal contempt.' And where the defendant had been enjoined from in-
fringement of a patent covering a refrigerating process, a contribution to
a general fund raised by a group of shippers of meat for the purpose of
financing defenses against suits brought by the patent holder was crimi-
nal contempt.'" Likewise, furnishing strikers with a meeting place near
the plant for the purpose of assisting them in their violation of the decree
is a criminal contempt.'" Where an injunction allowed peaceful picket-
ing, but restrained acts of violence, members of the strike committee were
291 U.S. 293, 299 (1934). Decrees of broad generality are often necessary to prevent
further violation. McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187 (1949). But the
court, in interpreting the decree, must define it as exact as the circumstances permit.
J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944); Terminal R.R. Ass'n v. United States,
266 U.S. 17 (1924). Also, if the injunction is ambiguous, one will not be guilty of crim-
inal contempt if he is placed in a dilemma by its terms. NLRB v. Bell Oil & Gas Co.,
98 F.2d 405 (5th Cir. 1938). Before one may be guilty of criminal contempt, there must
be an ability to comply. United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323 (1950) ; Healey v. United
States, 186 F.2d 164 (9th Cir. 1950).
11. United States v. So. Wholesale Grocers' Ass'n, 207 Fed. 434 (N.D. Ala. 1913).
12. McFarland v. United States, 295 Fed. 648 (7th Cir. 1923).
13. Minerich v. United States, 29 F.2d 565 (6th Cir. 1928) ; Ex parte Richards, 117
Fed. 658 (S.D. W. Va. 1928).
14. Bates Refrigerating Co. v. Gillett, 30 Fed. 683 (C.C. N.J. 1887).
15. Schwartz v. United States, 217 Fed. 866 (4th Cir. 1914).
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
guilty of criminal contempt for continuing the picket lines after repeated
violent incidents even though they ordered the pickets to behave in an
orderly manner."6 On the other hand, it was not criminal contempt for
the editor of a newspaper to write editorials calling the employees of a
company "dirty scabs," "snakes" and "scavengers."' 7  The injunction
in this case restrained strikers and their sympathizers from preventing
the employees from working by threats, intimidation or force. The court
said that the injunction contemplated only language that was spoken to
an employee and was not intended to include newspaper publications.
Also, where an injunction ordered the bankrupt to turn over all assets
to the trustee in bankruptcy, one not acting in concert with the bankrupt
is not guilty of criminal contempt for obtaining money belonging to the
bankrupt estate by defrauding the trustee. Such conduct was held not
to violate the order of the court."8 In another case, certain railroads
acting jointly as members of a "terminal association" were enjoined from
operating their property in any manner other than as a terminal facility
for the railroads that used them. The railroads comprising the associa-
tion were not guilty of criminal contempt for failing to pay reasonable
transfer charges to the association while requiring competing railroads
to pay full transfer charges.'"
Use of indirect and devious means to bring about disobedience of
an injunction may be criminal contempt. An individual, enjoined from
patent infringement cannot avoid punishment for a violation by incor-
porating for the purpose of creating an entity to infringe upon the
patent.2° In another case, the defendants were restrained from boycotting
a certain firm. After complying for fifteen months, the defendants be-
gan issuing to builders monthly booklets which contained a list of the
mills the defendants considered "fair." The complainant's name did not
appear on the list. A supplemental letter was issued with the booklets
which stated that unless the builders purchased their materials from the
"fair" mills, union labor would refuse to handle them. This was held to
constitute a criminal contempt of court.2 '
Non-action where there is a duty to act may be criminal contempt.
For example, where a strike occurred without express orders from the
union heads, a temporary restraining order was issued prohibiting the
16. Allis-Chalmers Co. v. Iron Molders' Union No. 125, 150 Fed. 155 (E.D. Wis.
1906).
17. Cohen v. United States, 295 Fed. 633 (6th Cir. 1924).
18. Morgan v. United States, 95 F.2d 830 (8th Cir. 1938).
19. Terminal R.R. Ass'n v. United States, 266 U.S. 17 (1924).
20. Frank F. Smith Hardware Co. v. Yates, 244 Fed. 793 (2d Cir. 1917) ; Bernard
v. Frank, 179 Fed. 516 (2d Cir. 1910).
21. Huttig Sash and Door Co. v. Fuelle, 143 Fed. 363 (E.D. Mo. 1906).
NOTES
union, its officers and all persons in active concert with them from con-
tinuing the strike. The strike continued for several days after service of
the order, until union demands had been granted. The defendant union
head ordered the workers back to work and they obeyed. The defendant
was held guilty of criminal contempt, not for causing or encouraging the
strike, but for failing to comply with the restraining order which sought
a return to work during arbitration.2 The act of ordering the workers
back to work showed the defendant's power to make them return. In an-
other case, a sheriff and his jailer were convicted of criminal contempt
for allowing a mob to break in the jail and lynch a Negro who had been
convicted of rape.2" After the prisoner had appealed, the Supreme Court
ordered a stay in all proceedings. The sheriff had expected mob violence
the night of the lynching as a result of public indignation at the inter-
ference of the federal courts. In spite of this knowledge, he dismissed
all deputies who had guarded the prisoner during the trial, leaving only
the night jailer on duty. The sheriff went to the jail after the mob had
entered but made no attempt to stop them beyond speaking to them, even
though he was armed. He made no effort to identify any of the mob
and, although police and military assistance were readily available, he
did not send for help. As to the jailer, as soon as the mob entered he
gave them his gun and keys. It was shown that he could have gone for
help but made no attempt to do so. The jailer and sheriff were held to
be guilty of criminal contempt for aiding and abetting the mob in violat-
ing the court's mandate through their non-action.
The place of the violation has no effect on the court's power to
punish for contempt. Thus acts committed in the Western District of
Arkansas which violate a decree issued in the Eastern District Court are
punishable as criminal contempt in the Eastern District Court.24
It is also clear that actual harm to those in whose favor the injunc-
tion was issued is not an element of criminal contempt. The complainant
has already proved in the injunction proceedings that he will be irrepar-
ably damaged if the defendant's conduct continues. Since the merits of
the injunction are not an issue in criminal contempt proceedings, an er-
roneous issuance of an injunction will not relieve a defendant from
punishment for criminal contempt. Even if the judgment had been re-
versed, acts committed before reversal may be the subject of subsequent
criminal contempt proceedings because the punishment is for past con-
22. United Mine Workers v. United States, 177 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
23. United States v. Shipp, 214 U.S. 386 (1909).
24. Binkley v. United States, 282 Fed. 244 (8th Cir. 1922). See McCourtney v.
United States, 291 Fed. 497 (8th Cir. 1923).
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duct, not a protection from prospective injury.2 5 However, if the injunc-
tion is completely void, so-called violations cannot be criminal contempt
because the injunction is a complete nullity.26 The defendant can do
nothing that would result in a violation of the court's decree or in ob-
structing the administration of justice when there is no valid order re-
straining him from acting. Thus no harm to the private interest is neces-
sary; an injunction shields the private interest from potential injury. The
necessary harm is the danger to the judicial system in allowing dis-
obedience and resistance to its decrees. Therefore the interest threatened
is strictly public in nature.
Consequently, the crucial factor in ascertaining what acts constitute
a violation of the decree is not whether the defendant's conduct violated
the decree, but whether his acts tended to bring about a violation. The
court should view the injunction in light of the circumstances which re-
sulted in its issuance and attempt to determine what conduct the issuing
court was seeking to prohibit, what interests it was seeking to protect
and in what manner it was trying to protect them. It is criminal con-
tempt if, after making these determinations, the consequences of the
defendant's acts resulted in a violation.
However, there is an intent factor that must be met before one may
be held guilty of criminal contempt; the violation must be wilful..2 7  It is
clear that an intent to defy the authority of the court fulfills the require-
ment as does an intention to disobey the injunction.28 While there are
some opinions to the contrary, it appears that an intent to do the acts
complained, of also meets the requirement of wilfulness.29  The necessary
intent is analogous to that usually required in criminal law. It is not the
intent to violate the law, or the injunction, but the intent to do the act the
law, or the injunction, forbids. ° For example, the court's order directed
25. Land v. Dollar, 190 F.2d 366 (D.C. Cir. 1951) ; Salvage Process Corp. v. Acme
Tank Cleaning Process Crop., 86 F.2d 727 (2d Cir. 1936); Blake v. Nesbet, 144 Fed.
279 (W.D. Mo. 1905).
26. Ex parte Rowland, 104 U.S. 604 (1882); Western Fruit Growers v. Gotfried,
136 F.2d 98 (9th Cir. 1943).
27. United States v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 163 F.2d 168 (7th Cir. 1947).
28. Anderson v. Comptois, 109 Fed. 971 (9th Cir. 1901); In re Wheeland, 108 F.
Supp. 10 (M.D. Pa. 1952).
29. See Moskovitz, Contempt of Injuictions, Civil and Criminal, 43 COLU%. L. REV.
780 (1943), where it is contended that there must be at least intent to violate the in-
junction. This view is supported in Proudfit Loose Leaf Co. v. Kalamazoo Loose Leaf
Binder Co., 230 Fed. 120, 131-4 (6th Cir. 1915). United States v. Kroger Grocery &
Baking Co., 163 F.2d 168 (7th Cir. 1947), while at first glance seems to support this
proposition, closer examination indicates that there is no intent in this case, therefore no
criminal contempt.
30. "One is always held to intend the direct, natural, and probable consequences of
acts intentionally done. Wrongful acts knowingly or intentionally committed can
neither be justified nor excused on the ground of innocent intent." It re Rice, 181 Fed.
NOTES
the defendant sheriff to receive a federal prisoner and keep him safely
in jail until his sentence expired. The defendant was told by the United
States marshall to give the prisoner "all the good treatment and liberty
possible because he was being unjustly punished and would soon be par-
doned." The prisoner was seen on several occasions driving about the
countryside with friends. In spite of an absence of any intent to violate
the order of the court, the defendant was found guilty of criminal con-
tempt." Thus a good faith belief that an injunction is being complied
with does not affect the wilful character of the violation. 2 Nor does
the fact that one acts upon advice of counsel relieve the wilful nature of
the contempt.33
A good faith belief that the injunction is being obeyed is, however,
a definite factor mitigating the severity of the punishment. Where an
injunction restrained any interference with mining operations of a cer-
tain company and intimidation of its employees, the strikers, acting in
the good faith belief that they were not violating the injunction, formed a
body of two hundred men and marched with music and banners between
the homes of the non-strikers and the mines. The column was so situ-
ated that the workers were forced to cross the lines in going to and re-
turning from work. There were no acts of violence nor use of boisterous
or abusive language. While the labor leaders were held guilty of crimi-
nal contempt for wilfully violating the decree, the good faith belief that
their action was proper led the court to impose a jail sentence of only
six days."4 In another case involving a similar injunction, the defendant
made a speech in a vacant lot adjacent to the struck plant calling the non-
strikers "scabs" and "blacklegs." As a result of his speech a group of
strikers marched on the factory in a menacing manner, shouting at and
cursing the employees. It was shown that the leaders of the strike coun-
seled obedience of the injunction and believed that they were complying
with it. The defendants were held guilty of criminal contempt but fined
only five dollars each because of their belief that they were acting within
the terms of the decree.3"
It therefore appears that the intent necessary to satisfy the wilful
requirement is merely intention to do the acts that constitute criminal
conempt. While this is the law, a better rule would require an intent to
violate the order of the court. The wrong is of a criminal nature and
217, 223 (N.D. Ala. 1910). See Economist Furnace Co. v. Wrought-Iron Range Co.,
86 Fed. 1010 (C.C. Ind. 1898).
31. Swepston v. United States, 251 Fed. 205 (6th Cir. 1918).
32. Bates Refrigerating Co. v. Gillett, 30 Fed. 683 (C.C. N.J. 1898).
33. In re La Varre, 48 F.2d 216 (S.D. Ga. 1930).
34. Mackall v. Batchford, 82 Fed. 41 (C.C. W. Va. 1897).
35. Ex parte Richards, 117 Fed. 658 (S.D. W. Va. 1902).
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arises out of a disregard for the authority of the court. Intent to dis-
obey the injunction should be a minimum requirement because without
this the authority of the court cannot be defied. The private interest in-
jured by a violation of a decree through ignorance has an adequate rem-
edy in civil contempt for damages and the public interest in maintaining
respect for the judiciary is not injured by violation of an injunction
where the defendant in good faith believed he was complying.
Courts have limited the scope of criminal contempt by attaching an
additional connotation to the word "wilful" by applying it to the nature
of the act by the alleged violator. Consequently, the meaning of "wilful"
is twofold: (1) intent to do acts which result in disobedience of an in-
junction and (2) some extenuating factor that makes a simple violation
more culpable. Thus a violation of the injunction accompanied with the
necessary intent (wilful in the former sense) could be criminal contempt,
but these courts have limited it further by requiring a flagrant violation
also characterized as wilful. Courts require both elements to be present.
Wilful, as used in the latter sense is difficult to define. Acts of violence
are a wilful violation, 6 as are threats of violence,37 inciting others to vio-
lence38 and allowing violent acts to continue where there is the power to
stop them." Repeated violations have also been held to be wilful.4"
Likewise fraudulent attempts to make disobedience seem lawful fall with-
in this category. 1 These are not definitive rules and seem only to repre-
sent the exercise of discretion of the court in its cautious use of criminal
contempt. Thus the court sometimes refuses to punish a seemingly clear
violation, as in the case where an injunction was issued ordering a Spanish
crew to abandon a ship and surrender possession to the owner's represen-
tative. The order was read in Spanish to the defendants who replied that
they would obey no order except one from the Spanish consul or the
ship's committee and would resist by force any attempt to take possession
of the ship. The court said this was not criminal contempt because the
36. Ibid.
37. Mackall v. Batchford, 82 Fed. 41 (C.C. W. Va. 1897); In re Wabash Ry. Co.,
24 Fed. 217 (W. D. Mo. 1885).
38. Stewart v. United States, 236 Fed. 838 (8th Cir. 1916).
39. United States v. Shipp, 214 U.S. 386 (1909) ; United States Mine Workers v.
United States, 177 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir. 1949) ; Phillips Sheet & Tin Plate Co. v. Amalga-
mated Ass'n of Iron, Steel & Tin Workers, 208 Fed. 335 (S.D. Ohio 1913). Furnishing
a meeting place for those who violate the injunction by use of force is a wilful viola-
tion. Schwartz v. United States, 217 Fed. 866 (4th Cir. 1914) ; as is allowing others
to use one's property in such a manner as to incite violence. (Placed sign bearing in-
sulting language in a window of a barbershop.) United States v. Taliaferro, 290 Fed.
906 (4th Cir. 1923).
40. In re Wheeland, 108 F.Supp. 10 (M.D. Pa. 1952).
41. In re La Varre, 48 F.2d 216 (S.D. Ga. 1930) ; Ex parte Young, 50 Fed. 526
(E.D. Tenn. 1892).
NOTES
defendants had not disobeyed any order.42  However, a more realistic
explanation seems to be that the court was reluctant to invoke the con-
tempt power with the resulting penal sanction against persons unfamiliar
with our law when the only injury sustained by the private interest was
a delay in obtaining possession of the vessel. In another case, a judgment
had been rendered against the defendant in a suit concerning a lessee's
right to possession and operation of certain mining property. The de-
fendant interfered on the mistaken assumption that the lessee had com-
mitted a breach which gave the defendant a right to possession. Because
the disobedience was prompted by ignorance, the court said the violation
was not wilful."
But there is a body of cases that seem to ignore this latter require-
ment of wilfulness."' Some of these may be rationalized on the basis
of the inadequacy of the civil contempt remedy because of the difficulty
in ascertaining damages. For example, where the injunction prohibited
suits concerning a shipwreck, the defendant was held guilty of criminal
contempt for instituting suit.4" Thus, while wilfulness in the sense of in-
tent is present, wilfulness in the other sense is not. Others may be justi-
fied on the grounds of the compelling public interest involved. Thus acts
may be classified as wilful if the policy underlying the injunction is:
(1) price control of vital materials during wartime;46 (2) governing
either management or labor in a labor dispute ;4 (3) enforcing the pro-
hibition laws;48 or (4) enforcing the anti-trust laws." Other cases,
where the injunction dealt with patent infringement, bankruptcy and
purely private interests, have also been held to be criminal contempt in
absence of any wilful conduct as required by some courts."0 In these,
there is no way of rationalizing or distinguishing the result. The court
simply ignored this aspect of the wilful requirement in these cases.
42. The Navemar, 17 F. Supp. 495 (E.D. N.Y. 1936).
43. Alabama Vermiculite Corp. v. Patterson, 130 F. Supp. 867 (W.D. S.C. 1955).
44. In re Mallow Hotel Corp., 18 F. Supp. 869 (M.D. Pa. 1937); Am. Const. Co.
v. Jacksonville, T. & K.W. Ry. Co., 52 Fed. 937 (N.D. Fla. 1892).
45. Brougham v. Oceanic Steam Navigation Co., 205 Fed. 857 (2d Cir. 1913).
46. United States ex r-el. Bowles v. Seidmon, 154 F.2d 228 (7th Cir. 1946).
47. Reliance Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 143 F.2d 761 (7th Cir. 1944), (Management);
United States v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 96 F. Supp. 428 (N.D. Ill. 1951),
(Labor).
48. Donato v. United States, 48 F.2d 142 (3d Cir. 1931) ; Hill v. United States, 33
F.2d 489 (8th Cir. 1929).
49. United States v. So. Wholesale Grocers' Ass'n, 207 Fed. 434 (N.D. Ala. 1913).
50. In re Fletcher, 216 F.2d 915 (4th Cir. 1954), (private) ; Cassidy v. Puett Elec.
Starting Gate Corp., 182 F.2d 604 (4th Cir. 1950), (patent infringement) ; Merchants'
Stock & Grain Co. v. Bd. of Trade, 201 Fed. 20 (8th Cir. 1912), (private); Clay v.
Waters, 178 Fed. 385 (8th Cir. 1910), (bankruptcy); Anderson v. Comptois, 109 Fed.
971 (9th Cir. 1901), (private); Bates Refrigerating Co. v. Gillett, 30 Fed. 683 (C.C.
N.J. 1887), (patent infringement).
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Therefore it seems that the term "wilful," as applied to the nature
of the act, means very little and is merely a reflection of the courts' hesi-
tancy to invoke its criminal contempt power in all but the most compelling
cases. The nature of the act is but one factor a court will weigh in de-
ciding whether the violation should be punished as criminal contempt.
Others to be considered are the value of the public interest protected by
the injunction and the adequacy of civil contempt and damages.
Another problem arises in determining what persons may be held
for criminal contempt when they act in a manner forbidden by the injunc-
tion. Clearly everyone cannot violate the injunction. The court cannot
enjoin the world at large." Those persons who are parties to the injunc-
tion suit and are specifically named in the decree may be guilty of crimi-
nal contempt, as may others impersonally named in the decree such as
agents, attorneys, and servants if the violative acts are performed with
actual knowledge of the injunction.5 2 The requirement of actual knowl-
edge has caused little difficulty in this area of the law. While the
knowledge must be actual,5" it is determined on an objective rather than
a subjective basis.54 Thus, in a criminal contempt proceeding involving
a liquor injunction, actual knowledge was found by service of the injunc-
tion upon the wife of one of the defendants. Additional factors in-
volved here were the small size of the community, indicating that if the
injunction was issued, the defendants were almost certain to be informed
of it, and the concert of action between the party served and the defend-
ants in maintaining the unlawful tavern.5 In a labor injunction case,
actual knowledge was found to exist on the part of the defendant union
leader on the basis of the prominent publication and posting of the in-
junction, the fact that the defendant could read, and the fact that the
union knew of the injunction when it sent the defendant to the scene of
the strike.56 On the other hand, newspaper publicity of the order and
notices posted at the scene of the violation have been held not to amount
to actual knowledge but only an inference of knowledge. Therefore,
clear opportunity to know is not sufficient." There must be additional
evidence showing that the defendant did know. A letter telling the de-
fendant of a court decision that a certain structure was held to be a patent
51. Kean v. Hurley, 179 F.2d 888 (8th Cir. 1950).
52. Ex parte Lennon, 166 U.S. 548 (1897) ; In re Reese, 107 Fed. 942 (8th Cir.
1901).
53. McCauley v. First Trust and Sav. Bank, 276 Fed. 117 (7th Cir. 1921) ; Dowagiac
Mfg. Co. v. Minnesota Moline Plow Co., 124 Fed. 736 (C.C. Minn. 1903).
54. Garrigan v. United States, 163 Fed. 16 (7th Cir. 1908).
55. Hill v. United States, 33 F.2d 489 (8th Cir. 1929).
56. Ex parte Richards, 117 Fed. 658 (S.D. W.Va. 1902).
57. See note 54, supra.
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infringement, without notice that the court had issued an injunction, was
not sufficient to amount to actual knowledge even where the trial court
had previously issued an injunction against the defendant on another
structure."8 Thus it is seen that the standard for actual knowledge is not
objective in the sense that one is held to know if by the exercise of rea-
sonable intelligence he should have known, but is objective in the sense
that a state of mind is ascertained only by viewing conduct and the
surrounding circumstances. The test is whether the defendant knew, not
whether he should have known, but in making the determination, objec-
tive facts must be weighed.
Persons incidentally named in the decree such as agents, servants
and attorneys may be guilty of criminal contempt, but only when acting
in the capacity in which they were enjoined.5" For example, where an in-
junction ran against a dealer and its agents prohibiting the sale of patent
infringing goods, a manufacturer who had previously sold the offending
goods to the dealer did not violate the injunction by selling them to
others.6" Where a president of an enjoined corporation makes a bona
fide severance with the corporation, he may perform the enjoined acts
without fear of criminal contempt.6 But where the resignation of an
officer is merely a subterfuge, the officer is still restrained by the
injunction."2
As to persons not named in the decree, there is some opinion that
anyone who performs the forbidden acts with actual knowledge of the in-
junction may be guilty of criminal contempt.63 In light of the majority of
cases, this view seems erroneous. The correct view seems to be that,
when persons not named in the injunction are involved, it must also be
shown that the unnamed person aided and abetted the enjoined parties in
the violation. 4 Aiding and abetting encompasses almost any act done
58 Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minnesota Moline Plow Co., 124 Fed. 736 (C.C. Minn.
1903).
59. Alemite Mfg. Corp. v. Staff, 42 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1930) ; Janney v. Pancoast
Int'l Ventilator Co., 124 Fed. 972 (C.C. E.D. Pa. 1903); Mexican Ore Co. v. Mexican
Guadalupe Mining Co., 41 Fed. 351 (C.C. N.J. 1891).
60. United States Playing Card Co. v. Spalding, 92 Fed. 368 (C.C. S.D. N.Y. 1899).
(Agent here includes manufacturer).
61. Hoover Co. v. Exchange Vacuum Cleaner Co., 1 F. Supp. 997 (S.D. N.Y. 1932).
62. Cassidy v. Puett Elec. Starting Gate Corp., 182 F.2d 604 (4th Cir. 1950).
63. This position is taken in Comment, 65 YALE L.J. 630 (1956).
64. Swetland v. Curry, 188 F.2d 841 (6th Cir. 1951) ; Alemite Mfg. Corp. v. Staff,
42 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1930) ; Puget Sound Traction, Light & Power Co. v. Lowrey, 202
Fed. 263 (W.D. Wash. 1913). See Annot., 15 A.L.R. 387 (1943).
This reasoning is further supported by FED. R. Civ. P. 65 (d) : "Every order grant-
ing an injunction . . . is binding only upon the parties to the action, their officers,
agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and upon those persons in active concert or
participation with them who receive actual notice of the order by personal service or
otherwise." (Emphasis added.) The courts have applied this rule in two instances to
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in violation of the injunction where there is some privity between the
parties. There need not be active concert between the defendant and the
enjoined party; it is sufficient if the relationship arises out of the de-
fendant's acts. That is, if the defendant performs the enjoined act, and
the purpose of the act is to further the interest of the enjoined party, then
it is aiding and abetting. For example, the injunction protected the re-
maining assets of a bankrupt. The defendant, a city marshal, executed
a writ of replevin against the property in the hands of a receiver in bank-
ruptcy. Although having no personal interest in the matter, the officer
was held for criminal contempt for aiding and abetting an enjoined
party.6 5 On the other hand, merely performing the forbidden act is not
sufficient. Where an injunction restrained interference with employees
at a certain mine, such interference ten years later, by a different union
and arising out of a new and wholly different attempt to unionize the
mine was held not to constitute criminal contempt. 6
Some courts have stated that one who is not named in the injunction
may still be punished for criminal contempt if he violates the decree with
knowledge, not requiring that the defendant be an aider and abettor.
Some of these cases can be dismissed on the grounds that the statements
are dicta.6" In others, while the courts set out this rule, it appears from
the facts that the defendants actually were aiding and abetting.6" In one
such case a railroad was enjoined from refusing to haul the complainant's
railroad cars and was ordered to continue to exchange cars with other
railroads. The defendant, an engineer for the enjoined railroad, refused
to haul one of the complainant's cars. The court, in holding the de-
fendant guilty of criminal contempt, said all that was necessary was
actual knowledge of the injunction and a violation. Though it was not
expressly recognized, the defendant in this case was an aider and abettor.
He was an employee of the enjoined party and the only conceivable pur-
pose he could have had in refusing the car was to further the interests
limit the scope of criminal contempt. See Kean v. Bailey, 82 F. Supp. 260 (Minn. 1949);
United States v. Dean Rubber Mfg. Co., 71 F. Supp. 97 (W.D. Mo. 1946).
See 2 HIGH, INJUNCTIONS § 1440(b) (4th ed. 1905) ; RAPALJE, CoNTEMPr § 47
(1884).
65. In re Wilk, 155 Fed. 943 (S.D. N.Y. 1907).
66. Tosh v. West Kentucky Coal Co., 252 Fed. 44 (6th Cir. 1908).
67. United States v. Debs, 64 Fed. 724, 755-6 (C.C. N.D. Ill. 1894); United
States v. Aglar, 62 Fed. 824, 827 (C.C. Ind. 1894).
68. Bessette v. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324 (1903), (defendants aided and abetted
those enjoined in violating the decree.) See Conkey Co. v. Russell, 111 Fed. 417 (C.C.
Ind. 1901) for a clearer statement of the facts; Diamond Drill & Mach. Co. v. Kelly
Bros. & Spielman, 120 Fed. 282 (E.D. Pa. 1904), (defended on the grounds that the
accused was not a party to the injunction and was merely an agent of one of the en-
joined parties).
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of his employer."9
The cases that expound this rule"0 base their contentions upon two
English cases which held that one need not be a named party to the in-
junction to be guilty of criminal contempt. In one case the servant of
the enjoined party had entered on another's land and cut timber that his
master had been restrained from cutting."' In the other case, a business
associate acted in concert with the enjoined party in violating the in-
junction by holding boxing matches upon certain premises.7 Although
the defendants were held guilty of criminal contempt in both cases, it was
clear that they were aiding and abetting the enjoined parties. Conse-
quently, it appears that aiding and abetting is necessary to hold a non-
party to an injunction amenable for criminal contempt and that use of
these two cases to support any broader rule is erroneous.
Without this restriction the court could, in effect, enjoin the world
at large. Also, this requirement is in accordance with Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 65 (d), which limits the court's power to bind persons by
injunction. As to the concept that disobedience by a non-party is not
a violation of the decree but an obstruction of justice, it is difficult to
understand how one not a party to the injunction can be guilty of ob-
structing justice, since the injunction merely orders certain parties to do,
or refrain from doing, certain acts. The aider and abettor must neces-
sarily be punished for contempt because without this requirement, the
enjoined party would be provided with a means of avoiding the decree
simply by procuring others to perform the forbidden act. But it is diffi-
cult to justify extension to persons with knowledge of the decree who
act independently of the enjoined parties. Such an extension deprives
one of a hearing adjudicating his rights in the matter. Holding a person
who assists the enjoined party in disobeying the decree guilty of criminal
contempt is justified by expediency in enforcing the injunction against
the named party and the fact that the aider and abettor has no legal in-
terest in the matter. But where one independently performs acts which
would violate the injunction if it applied to him, he has a personal in-
terest which goes to the merits of the injunction and should have a hear-
ing to decide his rights before he is compelled to comply.
While the criminal contempt power is justifiably feared, it is seen
69. Ex parte Lennon, 166 U.S. 548 (1897). This narrower construction of the
Lennon case was substantiated in Chase Nat'l Bank v. City of Norwalk, 291 U.S. 431,
436-7 (1934).
70. Two of the cases are indistinguishable; Kelton v. United States, 294 Fed. 491
(3d Cir. 1924) and Chisolm v. Caines, 121 Fed. 397 (C.C. S.C. 1903). Both hold that
anyone with actual knowledge is amenable to criminal contempt.
71. Wellesley v. Mornington, 11 Beav. 181 (1848).
72. Seaward v. Paterson, 1 Chy. 545 (1897).
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that it is a vital remedy if our legal system is to continue its use of in-
junctions. The substantive requirements applied by the courts set out a
system of self-imposed restraints which greatly limit the use of the power
and serve as a check against misuse of criminal contempt. Therefore,
in ordinary times, the substantive controls seem adequate. The great
danger lies in the use of the power to enforce some great social policy,
the justice of which most men cannot fail to agree upon. Such a policy
is desegregation. With an issue of such compelling national importance,
there is a possibility that the judges, in their anxiety to bring about racial
equality, will relax some of the controls.73 This might result in injustice
to some persons who are against the desegregation policy and perhaps
some who are merely victims of circumstances, caught between two
powerful forces. Many of the southern school authorities fall within
the last category.74 They are faced with strong local pressures on one
hand and the power of the federal courts on the other. Even those who
honestly wish to comply with the desegregation orders will have diffi-
culty. As to those who resist desegregation, while most cannot agree
with them, it is still highly desirable that they be afforded their full legal
rights. Therefore, the courts should exercise even greater caution in the
use of the contempt power, and because the procedural protections are
fewer, make certain that the substantive requirements are met.
MALPRACTICE AND THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Statutes of Limitation are said to serve the dual purpose of protect-
ing defendants against the evidentiary difficulties inherent in litigating
stale claims1 and providing for security of transactions with the passage
of time.2 In negligence cases, the stale claims policy consideration is
particularly cogent in view of the perishable nature of evidence usually
involved.' Thus, the shorter statutory period for actions to recover
73. This was not the case in In re Kasper, No. 1555 (E.D. Tenn. 1956). The de-
fendant was enjoined from interfering with the execution of a previously issued de-
segregation order. The restraining order was served on Kasper while he was making
a speech. He ignored the order and continued the speech in which he urged resistance
to the desegragation order. The court found this conduct amounted to inciting others
to violence and held the defendant guilty of criminal contempt.
74. See Hoxie School Dist. v. Brewer, 135 F. Supp. 296 (E.D. Ark. 1955), where
the school board sought to enjoin persons who were interfering with the board's at-
tempt to comply with a desegregation order.
1. See WOOD, LIMITATION OF AcTioNs § 5 (1st ed. 1882).
2. See Patterson, Can Law Be Scientificf, 25 ILL. L. REv. 121 at 144 (1930) ; Mar-
shall v. Watkins, 106 Ind. App. 235, 18 N.E.2d 954.
3. See Note, 28 CoNN. B. J. 346, 348.
